the marginal costs of tax avoidance at PE-backed firms. 8 We then directly disentangle the dual impact of the separation of ownership and control from the marginal costs of tax avoidance by including empirical proxies for these constructs in the same regression. We continue to find that while higher concentrations of ownership and control are associated with less corporate tax avoidance, our proxies for lower marginal costs of tax planning are associated with greater tax avoidance. These results hold in tests that compare tax avoidance at management-owned and PE-backed firms, and also amongst PE-backed firms only. We then consider a more common proxy for marginal costs -firm size -and examine the tax avoidance of small-vs. large-sized, management-owned and PE-backed firms. To the extent that PE firms are able to reduce the marginal costs of tax avoidance for their portfolio firms (small and large alike), we expect to find larger differences between small-sized management-owned and PE-backed firms than between large-sized management-owned and PE-backed firms, since large firms may enjoy economies of scale to tax planning independent of PE ownership (e.g., Rego, 2003; Dyreng et al., 2008) . The results are consistent with our predictions and indicate that small-sized firms experience the greatest tax savings from PE ownership.
To more directly capture inside stock ownership, we hand-collect data on the proportion of stock owned by all named executive officers for our sample of private firms, where available. The results based on the proportion of managerial stock ownership for this subsample of private firms, and also within subsamples of management-owned and PE-backed firms, confirm our main findings that firms with more highly concentrated ownership and control avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership and control. Finally, we provide exploratory evidence regarding the methods that PE-backed firms utilize to avoid more income taxes than management-owned firms. Our results broadly suggest that the lower effective tax rates of PE-backed firms are caused -at least in part -by their use of intangible assets, tax-exempt investments, tax credits, and the use of multi-jurisdictional tax planning, including affiliates in low-tax rate foreign countries.
Because PE firms do not randomly select firms to acquire, we acknowledge that our study addresses a joint hypothesis: (i) our model of PE ownership adequately controls for selection bias in our sample of management-owned and PE-backed private firms, and (ii) management-owned firms avoid less tax than PE-backed firms. To the extent our model does not adequately capture the determinants of PE ownership, then our results based on the Heckman (1979) and/or propensity score matching procedures may be unreliable. Nonetheless, we perform numerous other robustness tests (including the alternative approach taken in Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) , such that we are confident our results are highly robust.
Our study extends the accounting and finance literatures in several ways. Prior accounting research considers the impact of different organizational factors, including public vs. private ownership (e.g., Mills and Newberry, 2001 ), family ownership (Chen et al., 2010) , and dual-class stock ownership (McGuire et al., 2012) on corporate tax practices, but these studies provide disparate evidence on how ownership structure influences corporate tax avoidance. In contrast, we use Fama and Jensen's (1983) theory on the separation of ownership and control to understand how one attribute of ownership structure that is present in all public and private firms impacts corporate tax practices. Our findings are relevant for future research on the impact of ownership structure on corporate tax avoidance. They also increase our understanding of how PE firms generate value in their portfolio firms. Prior research documents that PE firms create value in their portfolio firms by implementing effective financial and operating strategies and by actively monitoring top executives at their portfolio firms (e.g., Cao and Lerner, 2009; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Masulis and Thomas, 2009 ). However, little is known about PE-backed firms' tax practices. Given recent criticisms of PE firm investment practices, 9 and the growing significance of PE firms for the U.S. capital markets, 10 our study provides new insights on the extent to which PE firms increase portfolio firm value by increasing their tax efficiency relative to other private firms.
Background and empirical predictions

The separation of ownership and control and prior tax research
Corporations exhibit substantial variation in the extent to which equity ownership is separated from control over corporate decision-making. At the extremes, small closely-held corporations have highly concentrated equity ownership and control, while large publicly-traded corporations have nearly complete separation of equity ownership and control. The separation of ownership and control creates well-known agency problems, including managerial incentives to pursue nonvalue-maximizing behaviors such as shirking, perquisite consumption, and rent extraction. To reduce these agency costs, 8 We utilize the delegation of authority papers by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Baker et al. (1999) to provide insights into why some PE firm owners might retain decision rights over tax planning at PE-backed firms (by requiring portfolio firms to acquire tax services from a particular tax service provider), but delegate authority over day-to-day operations (including the implementation of tax planning) to portfolio firm managers. 9 The rapid growth of the PE industry has raised concerns regarding anticompetitive behavior, excessive tax benefits, and stock manipulations in this sector (see Katz, 2009 and Section 2 for further discussion). 10 The cumulative capital commitments to non-venture capital PE firms in the U.S. between 1980 and 2006 is estimated to be close to $1.4 trillion (Stromberg, 2008) . In addition, approximately $400 billion of PE-backed transactions were announced in both 2006 and 2007, representing over 2% of the total capitalization of the U.S. stock market in each of these years (Kaplan, 2009) . Despite a decline in PE transactions since 2007, experts maintain that PE firms have become a permanent component of U.S. investment activity (e.g., Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009 ).
firms write contracts that align managers' incentives with those of shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Watts, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Fama and Jensen (1983) describe the circumstances in which firms should separate or combine decision management and decision control with residual risk sharing, where decision management includes the initiation and implementation of decisions by "decision agents" (typically top executives); decision control includes the ratification and monitoring of decisions and decision agents (typically by the board of directors); and the residual claimants of a firm (i.e., the common equity owners) share the residual risk and cash flows of the firm. Fama and Jensen (1983) explain that when residual risk sharing is separated from decision management (e.g., in larger organizations), then decision management should also be separated from decision control to reduce agency costs. In contrast, when decision management and decision control are concentrated in just a few agents (e.g., in smaller organizations), then residual claims should also be restricted to these agents. One key factor in their theory is the extent to which equity ownership is concentrated in a few decision agents (i.e., managers). In this case, Fama and Jensen (1983) state that it is rational for the managers to invest in less risky projects because their portfolios are likely less diversified than those of managers in organizations with more diffuse equity ownership. 11 We assume that the diversification of a manager's portfolio and professional reputation are decreasing in the proportion of stock owned in the firm. Thus, greater managerial stock ownership implies greater risk aversion. Consistent with Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Rego and Wilson (2012) , we further argue that tax avoidance is a risky activity in which undiversified, risk averse managers will minimize their investments. Tax avoidance can impose significant costs on firms and their managers, including fees paid to tax experts, time devoted to the resolution of tax audits, reputational penalties, and penalties paid to tax authorities. Thus, risk-averse owner-managers likely prefer to undertake less risky tax planning, while relatively risk-neutral shareholders prefer managers to implement all tax strategies that are expected to increase firm value, regardless of risk (Rego and Wilson, 2012) .
Prior accounting research has examined the impact of different ownership structures on corporate tax practices, but no single study has examined how the separation of ownership and control impacts tax avoidance for a broad set of firms. Instead, prior research has investigated tax avoidance at public vs. private firms (e.g., Beatty and Harris, 1998; Mikhail, 1999; Mills and Newberry, 2001) , at dual-class stock firms (McGuire et al., 2012) , at firms with hedge fund activists (Cheng et al., forthcoming) , and at family-owned firms (Chen, et al. 2010) .
12 Klassen (1997) documents that when divesting operating units, public firms that are subject to higher capital market pressure are more willing to trade-off higher tax costs for the benefit of higher financial accounting income than public firms subject to less capital market pressure. 13 In this study we use Fama and Jensen's (1983) theory on the separation of ownership and control to develop empirical predictions for variation in tax avoidance amongst private firms with different ownership structures, all of which are subject to less capital market pressure than public firms. 
Private equity firms
Our main empirical tests are based on management-owned and PE-backed private firms. PE firms manage investment funds that generally acquire majority control of mature, profitable businesses via leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions. We refer to these acquired businesses as "portfolio firms" or "PE-backed firms." Before we develop our empirical predictions, we first discuss the organizational structure of PE firms, and then describe how PE firms manage their portfolio firms (i.e., the PE-backed firms). This discussion provides the foundation for several empirical predictions, and ultimately is essential to understanding the "ownership and control" of PE-backed firms.
PE firms have received recent attention due to their substantial impact on merger and acquisition activity and their generous tax treatment in the U.S. and other countries. PE firms are typically organized as limited partnerships and most PE firm executive managers are partners in the PE firm. Thus, we also refer to PE firm managers as "PE firm partners." PE firms manage the PE investment funds that directly acquire mature, profitable businesses via LBO (see Fig. 1 ). PE funds primarily finance portfolio firm acquisitions with the capital contributed by limited partners (i.e., investors in the PE fund) and substantial amounts of debt, resulting in highly leveraged portfolio firms. PE firm partners contribute just a small proportion 11 The combination of decision management and decision control with residual risk sharing in a small number of agents also generates "efficiency losses because decision agents must be chosen on the basis of wealth and willingness to bear risk as well as for decision skills" (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 306) .
12 Chen et al. (2010) provide evidence consistent with our research question. Specifically, Chen et al. find that family-owned, public firms, which typically have more highly concentrated stock ownership than other public companies, avoid less tax than other public firms. However, it is the agency conflict between the founding family owners and minority shareholders that drives the results in Chen et al. (2010) , while it is the concentration of ownership and control that increases the risk aversion of managers and drives the results in our study. 13 Klassen (1997) utilizes inside ownership concentration as his proxy for capital market pressure, where the mean (median) inside ownership concentration for his sample of 327 public firms is 15.1 (8.2) percent. 14 For the most part we exclude public firms from our study, since publicly-traded firms are subject to greater financial reporting pressure due to greater scrutiny from investors, analysts, and regulators than private firms, and prior research demonstrates that greater financial reporting pressure differentially affects tax avoidance at public and private firms (e.g., Beatty and Harris, 1998; Mikhail, 1999; Mills and Newberry, 2001) . Nonetheless, Fama and Jensen's (1983) theory on how the separation of ownership and control should impact a manager's risk aversion can also be applied to a sample that only includes public firms. However, public firms generally exhibit substantially less variation in managerial stock ownership compared to our sample of private firms.
of the PE fund capital (i.e., approximately 1%). The limited partners pay annual management fees (typically 2% of invested capital) to the PE fund as compensation for PE fund investment operations. The PE fund also receives a 20% share (i.e., carried interest) of any gains generated by the sale or IPO of portfolio firms (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009 ). The taxation of PE firms and PE firm partners has been criticized as exceedingly unfair.
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The generally negative view of the tax benefits enjoyed by PE firms contrasts other characteristics associated with their management of portfolio firms. PE firms usually obtain a concentrated ownership stake and control of the board of directors with the intent of substantially improving portfolio firm performance. Portfolio firm boards are typically comprised of the CEO, PE firm partners, and outside industry experts. Portfolio firms' boards are smaller than comparable public firms' boards and they meet more frequently via both formal and informal meetings. These board members advise portfolio firm managers on strategic considerations, and actively monitor and motivate the management team (Cotter and Peck, 2001; Jensen, 2007; Cornelli and Karakas, 2008; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Masulis and Thomas, 2009) . PE firm partners use their control over the board of directors to impose performance-based compensation on portfolio firm managers and do not hesitate to replace them when they underperform (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Acharya et al., 2009) . As a result, portfolio firm boards are widely considered more effective than both public and other private company boards (Gilson and Whitehead, 2008; Masulis and Thomas, 2009; Strömberg, 2009) . In sum, prior research indicates that PE firms exercise substantial control over their portfolio firms' boards of directors and actively monitor the portfolio firm management team.
Large PE firms often hire professionals with operating backgrounds and industry expertise to work with portfolio firm managers (Gadiesh and MacArthur, 2008; Acharya et al., 2009) . To learn how PE firms influence the tax practices of their portfolio firms, we spoke with partners at a large public accounting firm that provides tax services to PE-backed firms. The partners indicated that PE firms frequently arrange for their portfolio companies to acquire tax services from a specific accounting firm, with the intention of reducing portfolio firm tax costs through more sophisticated tax strategies than would otherwise be used by the portfolio firm (e.g., maximizing the utilization of net operating loss carryforwards and R&D tax credits). Thus, some PE firms view tax planning as one avenue for increasing portfolio firm value.
While PE firm partners actively monitor portfolio firm operations through their control of portfolio firm boards, they generally do not assume management roles in PE-backed firms (e.g., Cao and Lerner, 2009; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009; Masulis and Thomas, 2009) . Instead PE firm partners act as advisors to the portfolio firm management team. In addition, PE firms typically acquire majority equity stakes in their portfolio companies. This separation of equity ownership (by PE firms) and decision management (by portfolio firm managers) at PE-backed firms leads to an ownership structure that also separates decision management from decision control (by portfolio firm boards). 16 In contrast, private firms that are owned 90 -95% 5 -10% Fig. 1 . Diagram of typical organizational structure for a private equity firm with one PE fund and four PE portfolio firms. *Approximately 10% of the total gain is often distributed to the management team as part of performance-based compensation, reducing the investors' share to approximately seventy percent (Fruhan, 2009) . 15 While the management fees are generally taxed as ordinary income (i.e., 35% tax rate), the carried interest is taxed as long-term capital gain (i.e., 15% tax rate). This tax treatment of carried interest, as well as the fact that some PE firms have been able to avoid corporate taxation once they file for an initial public offering (e.g., The Blackstone Group) has provoked numerous negative press reports, proposed changes to federal income tax laws, and academic studies on the tax treatment of PE firms (e.g. Fleischer, 2007 Fleischer, , 2008 Knoll, 2007; Cunningham and Engler, 2008; Lawton, 2008) . 16 This organizational structure is consistent with the prediction of Fama and Jensen (1983) that "when venture equity capital is put into a small entrepreneurial organization by outsiders, mechanisms for separating the management and control of important decisions are instituted" (footnote 9, p. 306).
by the firm's management often combine decision management, decision control, and equity ownership in a few individuals, which provides the basis for our empirical predictions.
Empirical predictions
Utilizing a variety of settings where the separation of ownership and control exhibits substantial variation, we empirically test one specific implication of Fama and Jensen's (1983) theory. In particular, we examine whether firms with more concentrated ownership and control avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership and control. We also consider a competing explanation for these findings, that being whether PE-backed firms enjoy lower marginal costs of tax planning, which in turn facilitate greater income tax avoidance.
Predictions for the separation of ownership and control and tax avoidance
To test our predictions we utilize a unique sample of private firms with privately-owned equity but publicly-traded debt. This sample holds financial reporting requirements constant, since all sample firms are required to file financial statements with the SEC. Nonetheless, sample firms are on average subject to less capital market pressure than similar public firms (e.g. Givoly et al., 2010) .
17 Our sample also exhibits substantial variation in the separation of ownership and control, making it a powerful setting to test our empirical predictions. Our primary tests are based on management-owned and PE-backed private firms. Katz (2009) documents that top executives at management-owned firms own greater proportions of company stock than top executives at PE-backed firms. As a result, management-owned firms exhibit higher concentrations of ownership and control than PE-backed firms. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) , we assume that the diversification of a manager's portfolio (and professional reputation) is decreasing in the proportion of stock owned in the firm. Thus, the higher concentrations of ownership and control at management-owned firms should cause their owner-managers to be more risk averse and tolerate less tax risk than managers at PE-backed firms, which leads to our first empirical prediction:
P1. Management-owned firms avoid less income tax than PE-backed private firms.
Prior research provides additional insights into variation in the separation of ownership and control at firms with different ownership structures. Amongst PE-backed firms, Katz (2009) demonstrates that the proportion of stock owned by top executives at minority-owned, PE-backed firms is significantly greater than managerial stock ownership at majorityowned, PE-backed firms. With respect to other types of firms, Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) and Acharya et al. (2010) assert that CEOs at PE-backed firms typically own larger proportions of portfolio firm stock than CEOs of public firms, while Bova et al. (2012a) and Bova et al. (2012b) state that employee-owned private firms generally have stock ownership that is diffused across many individuals. Taken together, these studies suggest that managerial stock ownership rates vary systematically across firms with different ownership structures and lead to the following empirical predictions that build on P1:
P1a. Minority-owned, PE-backed firms avoid less income tax than majority-owned, PE-backed firms.
P1b. Management-owned firms avoid less income tax than employee-owned firms.
P1c. Management-owned firms avoid less income tax than public firms.
These predictions are based on Fama and Jensen's (1983) theory that managers at firms with high concentrations of ownership and control likely have less diversified portfolios and thus should be more risk averse than managers at firms with less concentrated ownership and control, all else equal. We predict greater managerial risk aversion should lead to less income tax avoidance.
Predictions for the marginal costs of tax avoidance at PE-backed firms
It is possible that PE-backed private firms are fundamentally different from management-owned firms (beyond the differences in ownership and control) and these differences influence the tax practices at management-owned and PE-backed firms. One specific attribute that would allow PE-backed firms to avoid more income taxes than managementowned firms involves the marginal costs of tax avoidance at PE-backed firms. Prior theoretical research examines the circumstances in which a principal is likely to delegate authority (either formal or informal) to an agent. These studies find that the principal is likely to retain authority over decision making when the principal is better informed than the agent 17 To address concerns that PE-backed firms are subject to different financial reporting incentives than management-owned firms, since they are typically sold or taken pubic via IPO within 5-7 years of being purchased, we re-run our main tests separately for the sub-groups of private firms that (1) eventually go public and (2) that once were public but then go private. That is, we first compare the tax avoidance of management-owned and PE-backed firms during the first five private firm-years (if available) after transitioning from public ownership. We then compare the tax avoidance of managementowned and PE-backed firms during the last five private firm-years (if available) prior to transitioning to public ownership. Our results (untabulated) confirm that management-owned firms avoid less tax than PE-backed firms.
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Baker et al., 1999) . 18 In our research setting, PE firms (and PE firm general partners) can be considered the "principals" in the authority literature, while portfolio firm management teams are the "agents." From this perspective, we can evaluate the extent to which PE firms are likely to "retain authority" over tax planning at their portfolio companies. PE firms have substantial experience in owning and monitoring a broad set of portfolio companies and their tax strategies. Thus, in effect PE firms are better informed than portfolio firm managers about a broad range of tax planning opportunities and extant theory on formal and informal authority in organizations would suggest that PE firms are likely to retain authority over tax planning at portfolio companies. In contrast, PE firms are not likely to retain authority over most portfolio firm operating decisions, since portfolio firm managers are typically better informed than PE firm partners with respect to day-to-day operating decisions. Our understanding is that many PE firms effectively retain decision rights over tax planning at PE-backed firms by arranging tax service providers for their portfolio firms. Thus, because PE firms typically own more than one portfolio firm, PE firms should be able to reduce the marginal costs of tax avoidance at PE-backed firms by applying similar tax planning strategies at more than one PE-backed firm and/or by negotiating lower fees with tax service providers on behalf of their portfolio firms. Lower marginal costs of tax avoidance at PE-backed firms would be consistent with PE firms' reputation for reducing portfolio firms' costs of debt with lenders (e.g., Kaplan and Stomberg, 2009; Demiroglu and James, 2010; Ivashina and Kovner, 2011) . Thus, we posit that PE firms have the ability to generate economies of scale and scope for tax avoidance at PE-backed firms. Conversations with tax partners at a large public accounting firm are consistent with this assertion. These partners explained that some (but not all) PE firm clients effectively retain decision rights with respect to tax planning at PE-backed firms by arranging a particular tax service provider for most or all of their portfolio firms. 19 The centralization of tax accounting services should reduce the marginal costs of tax planning at PE-backed firms, resulting in greater tax avoidance at PE-backed firms relative to management-owned firms. 20 Thus, we also examine the extent to which variation in the marginal costs of tax planning impact tax avoidance at private firms.
To identify which PE-backed firms likely possess lower marginal costs of tax planning while also holding the separation of ownership and control relatively constant, we first restrict our analyses to only PE-backed firms. Within this subsample, we assert that firms owned by PE firms with "many" portfolio companies are likely to have lower marginal costs of tax planning than firms owned by PE firms with "fewer" portfolio companies. We classify a PE firm as having "many" portfolio firms if they own more than 200 portfolio firms and their average equity investment is greater than $30 million. We classify all PE firms not meeting these two requirements as having "fewer" portfolio firms. PE firms that own many portfolio companies should enjoy economies of scale and scope with respect to tax planning costs at their portfolio firms, since the same tax planning strategies can potentially be utilized at a larger number of portfolio firms. Thus, our next empirical prediction is:
P2a. Firms that are owned by PE firms with more portfolio firms avoid more income tax than firms that are owned by PE firms with fewer portfolio firms.
Consistent with the discussion above, we also partition PE-backed firms based on whether they are owned by large or small PE firms, where "large" PE firms include the 15 largest PE firms as measured by total capital under PE firm management during our sample period. 21 We classify all other PE firms as "small" PE firms. We expect firms that are owned by large PE firms to have lower marginal costs of tax planning than firms that are owned by small PE firms, since large PE firms should enjoy economies of scale and scope with respect to tax planning costs at their portfolio firms. Indeed, prior research shows that large PE firms regularly outperform smaller PE firms, consistent with a greater ability to create financial value through operational improvements at portfolio firms (e.g., Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Acharya et al., 2009 ). Thus, our next empirical prediction is:
P2b. PE-backed firms that are owned by large PE firms avoid more income tax than PE-backed firms that are owned by smaller PE firms.
We then consider variation in the marginal costs of tax planning amongst management-owned and PE-backed firms. Within this larger sample, we continue to predict firms that are owned by large PE firms and/or PE firms with more portfolio firms avoid more tax than other private firms due to lower marginal costs of tax planning. We also 18 Aghion and Tirole (1997) claim that asymmetric information is the key to understanding the delegation of authority. They also explain that formal authority is likely to be delegated for decisions that are (1) relatively unimportant for the principal, (2) but important to the agent, (3) for which the principal can trust the agent, and (4) are sufficiently innovative that the principal does not have substantial experience or competency.
19 These partners also stated that PE firms similarly reduce other portfolio firm costs by centralizing certain administrative services for their portfolio companies. For example, some PE firms require their portfolio firms to purchase legal services from specific law firms and insurance services from specific insurance firms. 20 However, tax services must be tailored to fit the particular needs of each portfolio company and so it is not clear that PE-backed firms truly enjoy lower marginal costs of tax planning. 21 The 15 consider a more common proxy for marginal costs -firm size -and examine the tax avoidance of small-vs. large-sized, management-owned and PE-backed firms. To the extent that PE firms reduce the marginal costs of tax planning by centralizing tax services for their portfolio firms (small and large alike), we expect to find greater differences between smallsized, management-owned and PE-backed firms than between large-sized, management-owned and PE-backed firms, since large-sized firms may enjoy economies of scale to tax planning independent of PE ownership (e.g., Rego, 2003; Dyreng et al., 2008) . 22 We define small-sized (large-sized) firms as those in the lowest (highest) quartile of net sales for our sample of private firms and predict:
P2c. The difference in tax avoidance at small-sized, PE-backed and management-owned firms is larger than the difference in tax avoidance at large-sized, PE-backed and management-owned firms.
Lastly, we attempt to disentangle the dual impact of the separation of ownership and control from the marginal costs of tax planning on corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we hand-collect managerial stock ownership data for our samples of management-owned and PE-backed firms, which allows us to include empirical proxies for a manager's risk aversion and the marginal costs of tax planning in the same regression. As previously explained, we assume that the diversification of a manager's portfolio is decreasing in the proportion of stock owned in the firm and lower diversification leads to greater risk aversion. Our final empirical prediction is:
P3. Holding the marginal costs of tax avoidance constant, private firms with managers that own larger proportions of the firm's stock avoid less income tax than private firms with managers that own smaller proportions of the firm's stock.
Research design
Measures of corporate tax avoidance
We rely on several measures of tax avoidance because different measures capture different aspects of corporate tax planning. Our first two measures are based on effective tax rates and include GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR, where GAAP_ETR (CASH_ETR) is total tax expense (cash taxes paid) summed over three years, scaled by adjusted pretax income summed over three years.
23 Both measures convey a firm's average tax cost per dollar of pretax income and capture a broad range of tax planning activities that can have both certain and uncertain outcomes with tax authorities. Recent research presents evidence that both effective tax rate measures reflect variation in tax avoidance across firms (Dyreng et al., 2008) . We complement these effective tax rate measures with two additional measures designed to capture more risky tax avoidance: Frank et al.'s (2009) discretionary permanent book-tax difference measure (DTAX) and Wilson's (2009) measure of tax sheltering (SHELTER). While DTAX is the residual from a regression of permanent book-tax differences on nondiscretionary sources of those differences, 24 SHELTER is the predicted value from a tax shelter prediction model. Frank et al. (2009) demonstrate that DTAX is significantly associated with actual cases of tax sheltering and Wilson (2009) demonstrates that SHELTER is able to predict tax shelter activity out-of-sample. See the Appendix for details on how we calculate each of these measures. We acknowledge that all four measures reflect income tax avoidance with error. While the effective tax rate measures are commonly used in accounting research and understood by a broad set of financial statement users, they capture all types of tax avoidance (i.e., risky and non-risky strategies alike). Moreover, GAAP_ETR is confounded by changes in tax reserves and the valuation allowance, while CASH_ETR is confounded by the timing of tax payments, settlements with tax authorities, and some types of earnings management. In contrast, DTAX and SHELTER were designed to capture more risky tax avoidance, and in fact both measures are associated with tax shelter transactions (Frank et al., 2009; Wilson, 2009) . But DTAX only captures tax strategies that generate permanent book-tax differences (i.e., not those that create temporary book-tax differences) and both DTAX and SHELTER are based on cross-sectional empirical models that are subject to criticisms similar to those directed at discretionary accrual models (i.e., the models estimate tax avoidance with error). None of the four measures are clearly superior (or inferior) to the other three. Consequently, we rely on all four measures in our empirical tests to evaluate the robustness of our results. 22 Note that the term "large PE" firm refers to economies of scale and scope of the PE firm, while the term "large-sized PE-backed" firm refers to economies of scale and scope of the PE-backed firm.
23 Whenever possible we use three years of data to calculate GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR. However, if data limitations (such as transition years or missing values) prohibit us from using three years of data, we next use two years, followed by one year of data. Results are qualitatively similar if we base our calculations on one year of data. 24 GAAP_ETR also reflects variation in permanent book-tax differences, where permanent book-tax differences are differences between financial and taxable income that do not reverse through time (e.g., interest income from municipal bonds is exempt from federal income taxation but included in pretax financial income). DTAX is distinct from GAAP_ETR because Frank et al.'s (2009) model is designed to remove non-discretionary sources of permanent book-tax differences from GAAP_ETR to isolate intentional, more aggressive tax avoidance.
Modeling the impact of separation of ownership and control on corporate tax avoidance
To investigate whether the separation of ownership and control impacts corporate tax avoidance we utilize a sample of private firms that are owned by either PE firms or by the firm's management team. Because PE firms do not randomly select firms to acquire, selection bias may be present in our empirical tests. Specifically, if PE firm acquisition choices are correlated with target firm tax planning, then PE firm ownership could be endogenously related to tax avoidance in our sample. This endogeneity would cause OLS coefficient estimates to be biased. To correct for selection on unobservable differences between management-owned and PE-backed firms, we follow the Heckman (1979) procedure and implement a treatment effect model (Lennox et al., 2012) . We perform this two-stage estimation procedure for all regression analyses that include both management-owned and PE-backed private firms. In the first stage, we use Lee's (1979) switching simultaneous equation (see Maddala, 1983, Chapter 9) to estimate the following probit regression, which predicts whether a private company is owned by a PE firm:
This equation is based in part on existing models of private investor financing and PE ownership. Importantly, it includes three exclusion restriction variables (i.e., Q_RATIO, OPER_CYCLE, and FIRM_AGE) that are significant predictors of PE ownership but because we do not expect these variables to be directly related to corporate tax avoidance, they are excluded from the second stage regression. 25 Prior research finds that PE firms tend to acquire firms with lower risk of financial distress (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1993) . Thus, consistent with models of PE and private ownership in Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , Katz (2009), and Givoly et al. (2010) , we select both Q_RATIO and OPER_CYCLE as exclusion restriction variables for eq. (1). FIRM_AGE is the third exclusion restriction based on recent research that indicates younger firms are more likely to be taken private because they fail to attract investor recognition as a public firm (Mehran and Peristiani, 2010) .
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The remaining equation (1) variables are primarily included because the Heckman (1979) procedure requires that all second stage regression variables also be included in the first stage regression. We note, however, that prior research on PE firm ownership finds that PE firms generally acquire targets that are growing (SALES_GR), have greater profitability (RNOA, LOSS, NOL) but lower leverage (LEV) (e.g., Acharya et al., 2009; Aslan and Kumar, 2011) . Hence, prior research suggests these variables are also significant determinants of PE ownership.
We compute the inverse Mills' ratio (INV_MILLS) for each firm-year observation based on the estimated coefficients for Eq. (1), and then include that variable in Eq. (2), the second stage of the Heckman estimation procedure:
P1 predicts that management-owned firms avoid less income tax than PE-backed firms. Thus, the variable of interest in Eq. (2) is MGMT_OWNED, which is an indicator variable equal to 'one' if a firm is majority-owned by its current and past named executive officers, and 'zero' if otherwise. The dependent variable, TAX, represents the four proxies for corporate tax avoidance: GAAP_ETR, CASH_ETR, DTAX, and SHELTER. If management-owned firms avoid less tax than PE-backed firms, then the coefficient on MGMT_OWNED should be significant and positive (negative) in regressions where GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR (DTAX and SHELTER) are the dependent variables. See the Appendix for detailed definitions of each variable included in Eqs. (1) and (2). Eq. (2) also includes controls for factors that influence a firm's tax avoidance activity, as documented by prior research (e.g., Manzon and Plesko, 2002; Rego, 2003; Dyreng et al., 2008; Frank et al., 2009; Wilson, 2009; Chen et al., 2010) . The first set of control variables, which includes RNOA, LOSS, NOL, and LEV, controls for a firm's need to tax plan. We include an indicator variable, LOSS, and the return on net operating assets (RNOA) as proxies for current profitability, since profitable firms have greater incentives to tax plan. We include an indicator variable for the presence of net operating loss carryforwards (NOL) at the beginning of the year, since firms with loss carryforwards have less incentive to engage in current year tax planning. We include a firm's leverage ratio (LEV) because firms with greater leverage have less need to tax plan due to the tax benefits of debt financing.
We include an indicator variable for foreign operations (MNC) in Eq. (2), since firms with foreign operations have greater opportunities for tax avoidance by shifting income between high and low tax rate locations (e.g., Rego, 2003) . MNC equals 'one' if a firm reports non-zero foreign income or foreign tax expense, and zero if otherwise. We control for intangible assets (INTANG) and equity in earnings of unconsolidated affiliates (EQ_EARN) because these items often generate differences between book and taxable income and can thus affect our tax avoidance measures. We include sales growth (SALES_GR) in Eq. (2) because growing firms likely make larger investments in depreciable assets, which generate larger temporary book-tax differences and can thus affect some tax avoidance measures. We control for firm size (ASSETS) because large firms likely enjoy economies of scale in tax planning. We include an indicator variable for years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), since prior research demonstrates that the regulatory environment surrounding corporate financial and tax reporting changed substantially in the post-SOX time period (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008) . We further include year (YEAR) and industry (INDUS) fixed-effects to control for fundamental differences in tax planning that may exist across years and industries. Frank et al. (2009) find a strong positive relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. Katz (2009) documents that PE-backed firms report more conservatively and engage in less earnings management compared to non-PE-backed firms. To the extent our test and control firms exhibit different financial reporting quality, we need to control for financial reporting quality in Eq. (2). Thus, we control for both timely loss recognition and earnings management by including AB_ACCR in Eq. (2).
27 AB_ACCR is the amount of abnormal accruals after controlling for conservatism in our abnormal accruals calculation (see Ball and Shivakumar, 2006) . Our last control variable is the inverse Mills ratio (INV_MILLS) calculated based on the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure.
Sample selection and empirical results
Sample selection
Our initial sample consists of private firms that have publicly-traded debt. Because their debt is public, these firms must file financial statements with the SEC, even though their equity is privately-held. We follow Katz (2009) and select all firmyear observations on Compustat in any of the 31 years from 1980 through 2010 that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the firm's stock price at fiscal year-end is unavailable, (2) the firm has total debt as well as total annual revenues exceeding $1 million, (3) the firm is a domestic company, (4) the firm is not a subsidiary of another public firm, and (5) the firm is not a financial institution or in a regulated industry (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4800-4900). To ensure that the sample includes only private firms with public debt, we examine each firm and remove public firm observations (details provided in Table 1 , Panel A). We further categorize each firm as being in one of the following categories: (1) management-owned, defined as firms that do not have a PE sponsor and are at least 50% owned by founders, current and past named executive officers, and/or their families, (2) PE majority-owned, defined as firms whose equity is majority-owned (i.e., more than 50%) by PE firms, according to Thomson Financials VentureXpert, and (3) PE minority-owned, defined as firms whose equity is minority-owned (i.e., less than or equal to 50%) by PE firms. The resulting sample consists of 2628 private firm-year observations and 549 private firms. Table 1 , Panel B, presents the industry composition of our sample of private firms with public debt (i.e., the 2628 firmyear observations in Panel A). Our sample of private firms with public debt is generally consistent with the broader Compustat population over the same time period. Only the proportion of private firms classified as retail firms is significantly different from the Compustat population (25.1 vs. 9.4%).
We hand-collect managerial stock ownership data for our sample of private firms (where available) as an alternative proxy for the separation of ownership and control. Specifically, we hand-collect from SEC filings the total amount of stock owned by all named executive officers. 28 We then calculate the proportion of all outstanding common shares owned by these executive officers and refer to this variable as MGR_STOCK. Because managerial stock ownership data is only available for 374 of our 549 private firms, we use MGR_STOCK as our secondary proxy for the separation of ownership and control, while MGMT_OWNED is our primary proxy. Table 2 presents statistics on the proportions of stock owned by PE firms, all named executive officers (i.e., Managers), and CEOs for 9 different categories of private firms, including different types of PE-backed and employee-owned private firms.
Descriptive statistics on stock ownership at private firms
29 Asterisks indicate significant differences between the mean and median amounts of stock owned by PE firms/ Managers (including CEOs)/CEOs Only at management-owned firms (row 1) compared to other types of private firms (rows 2-9). Overall, the results in Panel A indicate that managers not only own the majority of stock in management-owned firms (by definition), but their percentage stock ownership (mean¼ 66.4%, column 2) is also substantially larger at management-owned firms compared to all other types of firms. Amongst PE-backed firms, managers own greater proportions of stock at firms that are minority-owned by PE firms (mean ¼29.9%, row 4) than at other PE-backed firms. In fact,
27 Results (untabulated) are substantially similar if we replace AB_ACCR with the absolute value of AB_ACCR. 28 For each firm, we collect stock ownership data for only one firm-year and assume stock ownership remains relatively constant all years the firm remains in our sample, unless we determine that the firm experienced a change in ownership structure. In this case we collect stock ownership data for at least 1 year after the change in ownership structure. 29 Employee-owned firms are private firms that do not have a PE sponsor and whose equity is more than 50% owned by employees. These firms are excluded from most analyses, except Tables 2 and 5, Panel D. mean (median) managerial stock ownership at majority-owned, PE-backed firms (row 3) is just 7.0 (3.7) percent. We also note that CEOs (column 3) account for the majority of stock ownership by Managers (column 2) regardless of firm type. We conclude that our sample of private firms exhibits substantial variation in managerial stock ownership, making it a powerful setting to examine the impact of the separation of ownership and control on corporate tax avoidance. To more closely evaluate the separation of ownership and control at PE-backed vs. management-owned firms, we handcollect data on board composition and CEO characteristics from SEC filings and the BoardEx database. To minimize the handcollection process, we randomly select three minority PE-backed firms for each year in our sample and match them with both majority PE-backed and management-owned firms in the same year and same four four-digit SIC code. Descriptive statistics based on this hand-collected data (results untabulated) indicate that while 57% of board members at managementowned firms are insiders, the proportions of insiders on boards at minority-and majority-owned, PE-backed firms are significantly smaller at 45% and 30%, respectively. In fact, PE firm representatives account for 62 (39) percent of the board membership at majority-owned (minority-owned) PE-backed firms. The chairman of the board is a representative of the PE firm owner 29 (48) percent of the time, and the CEO is either nominated by or is affiliated with the PE firm owner 58 (44) percent of the time at majority-(minority-)owned PE-backed firms. These statistics clearly demonstrate PE firms' abilities to monitor and control portfolio firms' management and boards of directors, consistent with the discussion in Section 2.2. 
Results for the separation of ownership and control and tax avoidance
The evidence in Table 2 indicates that the rates of managerial stock ownership differ significantly between managementowned and PE-backed private firms. Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that when equity ownership and corporate decisionmaking are concentrated in just a small number of decision-makers, these owner-managers will likely be more risk averse and less willing to invest in risky projects, which we argue includes income tax avoidance. To examine the impact of the separation of ownership and control on corporate tax avoidance at sample firms, we perform the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure to correct for selection on unobservable differences between management-owned and PE-backed firms. Table 3 , Panel A, presents the mean and median values for all variables included in the second stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure. The statistics for our four measures of tax avoidance (GAAP_ETR, CASH_ETR, DTAX, and SHELTER) uniformly suggest that management-owned firms avoid less income tax than PE-backed private firms. Specifically, the mean and median amounts of GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR are statistically higher, while the mean and median amounts of DTAX and SHELTER are significantly lower for management-owned firm-years. These results are consistent with P1, which predicts that management-owned firms avoid less income tax than PE-backed private firms. Panel A also indicates that management-owned firms are significantly different from PE-backed firms in many respects, including higher profitability (RNOA), fewer tax losses (LOSS and NOL), lower leverage (LEV), fewer intangibles (INTANG), less foreign operations (MNC), higher abnormal accruals (AB_ACCR), and fewer total assets (ASSETS). In supplemental analyses we also perform a propensity score matching procedure to correct for any possible selection bias based on observable differences between managementowned and PE-backed firms (see Section 4.7.1). Table 3 , Panel B, presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between the MGMT_OWNED indicator variable and each measure of tax avoidance. Consistent with Panel A, the correlations in Panel B indicate that management-owned firms avoid less tax than PE-backed firms. In addition, most of the correlations between the measures of tax avoidance are as expected. In particular, the ETR measures are positively correlated with each other, while DTAX and SHELTER are positively correlated with each other. However, CASH_ETR is not correlated with DTAX, perhaps because the latter measure is designed to capture more risky tax avoidance. Table 4 , Panel A, presents results for the first stage of the Heckman (1979) procedure. Recall that Q_RATIO, OPER_CYCLE, and FIRM_AGE are exclusion restriction variables that are excluded from the second stage regression. 30 The coefficients on each of these variables are statistically significant, as are most of the coefficients on the other independent variables in the first stage regression (except for the coefficients on RNOA, EQ_EARN, SALES_GR, and SOX). Untabulated results indicate that inclusion of the three exclusion restriction variables increases the MacKelvey-Zavonia pseudo-R-squared from 57.8% to 60.2% and increase McFadden's LRI pseudo-R-squared from 18.4% to 21.1% (see tabulated results at bottom of Panel A). These latter statistics are larger than the 18-19% reported in related studies (e.g. Lee and Wahal, 2004; Morsfield and Tan, 2006) . We conclude that the exclusion restriction variables and our model have significant explanatory power in predicting PE ownership. Heckman (1979) procedure, which tests whether management-owned firms avoid less income tax than PE-backed private firms as predicted by P1. 31 The coefficients on all four measures of tax avoidance are in the predicted directions and are statistically significant based on two-tailed p-values, providing support for P1. 32, 33 The coefficient on MGMT_OWNED in the CASH_ETR (GAAP_ETR) regression indicates that management-owned firms pay on average 7.5 (4.2) cents more income tax per dollar of adjusted pre-tax income than PE-backed private firms. This result suggests a large economic difference in tax avoidance between management-owned and PE-backed firms. Given mean pretax income of $27.8 million (untabulated) for our sample, the coefficient on MGMT_OWNED in the CASH_ETR (GAAP_ETR) regression translates into greater tax costs of approximately $2.1 ($1.2) million for managementowned firms compared to PE-backed firms. These results are economically smaller than those in Chen et al. (2010) , which find that on average family-owned, public firms avoid $6.7 ($2.8) million less income tax than non-family-owned, public firms. Nonetheless, our results should be interpreted with caution as endogeneity can influence coefficient estimates and in fact the MGMT_OWNED coefficients vary in magnitude across different estimation methods (e.g., Heckman vs. propensity score matching procedures). We instead focus on the consistency of the signs and significance levels of the MGMT_OWNED coefficients across different estimation methods. The coefficients on INV_MILLS are not significant in Panel B, consistent with selection bias having little impact on our estimates. Stolzenberg and Relles (1997) argue that if selection bias is moderate then the two-step estimation approach can generate coefficients that are inferior to those from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Thus, we also use OLS to reestimate Eq. (2), excluding INV_MILLS. We present only the coefficients on MGMT_OWNED in Panel C of Table 4 . Although the magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat attenuated (e.g., the coefficient on MGMT_OWNED in the CASH_ETR regression Panel A: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Differences between means are tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test; differences in medians are tested for significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Panel B: Bold indicates significance at the greater than 10% level based on a two-tailed t-test. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. 31 The number of observations differs across most regressions due to different data requirements. The GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR regressions are based on fewer observations (1701 and 1441, respectively) because these measures require firms to have positive pretax income. 32 Regressions where DTAX (SHELTER) is the dependent variable do not include INTANG and EQ_EARN (RNOA, LEV, MNC, AB_ACCR, and ASSETS) because those variables are included in the estimation of DTAX (SHELTER), and thus are orthogonal to DTAX (SHELTER), by design. 33 We include LOSS in the GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR regressions because GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR are scaled by the sum of pretax net income over years t, t À 1, and t À 2, while LOSS captures whether year t's net income is less than zero.
is now just 0.051), inferences remain the same. Management-owned firms avoid significantly less tax than PE-backed firms, consistent with the separation of ownership and control having a significant impact on the tax avoidance practices of private firms. In Table 5 , we present results for supplemental tests that further evaluate the impact of the separation of ownership and control on corporate tax avoidance (control variables included but not tabulated). In each of these tests we estimate Eq. (2) but vary the sample composition and/or utilize a different proxy for the separation of ownership and control. Panels A and B extend the analyses in Table 4 and separately compare the tax avoidance of management-owned firms to that of majorityowned (Panel A) and minority-owned (Panel B) PE-backed firms. As expected, the coefficients on MGMT_OWNED indicate that management-owned firms avoid less income tax than both majority-owned and minority-owned, PE-backed firms. Given the greater managerial stock ownership percentages in Table 2 for minority-owned, PE-backed firms relative to majority-owned, PE-backed firms, we compare the tax avoidance of these two types of private firms in Panel C. We find that minority-owned, PE-backed firms avoid significantly less income tax than majority-owned, PE-backed firms, consistent with P1a. The coefficients on MGMT_OWNED in Panel D indicate that management-owned firms avoid less income tax than employee-owned firms, which have more diffuse stock ownership. These results support P1b. Panel E compares the tax avoidance of management-owned firms and public firms. Consistent with empirical prediction P1c, the coefficients on MGMT_OWNED in Panel E suggest that management-owned firms avoid less income tax than public firms. 34 In sum, Table 5 provides additional evidence that our findings for P1 are robust to different proxies for the separation of ownership and control and for firms with different ownership structures.
Results for the marginal costs of tax avoidance at PE-backed firms
Empirical predictions P2a-P2c consider alternative explanations for our findings in Table 4 that management-owned firms avoid less income tax than PE-backed private firms. Specifically, P2a (P2b) predicts that private firms owned by PE firms with many portfolio firms (large PE firms) have lower marginal costs of tax avoidance and, as a result, avoid more income tax than other firms. We first test these predictions by re-estimating Eq. (2) based on our sample of PE-backed firms only, while including proxies for the marginal costs of tax avoidance. MANY_PE (LARGE_PE) is an indicator variable for 34 We acknowledge that public and private firms are subject to substantially different financial reporting incentives, which may influence our results.
In untabulated analyses, we also re-estimate the Panel E regressions based on propensity score matched samples of management-owned private firms and publicly-traded companies. Inferences from those regressions are qualitatively similar to those based on the results in Panel E.
whether a PE-backed firm is owned by a PE firm with many portfolio firms (large PE firm). If firms owned by PE firms with many portfolio firms (large PE firms) have lower marginal costs of tax avoidance, the estimated coefficients on MANY_PE (LARGE_PE) should be negative (positive) in the GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR (DTAX and SHELTER) regressions. Table 6 , Panel A, summarizes the OLS results where MINORITY_PE is our proxy for the separation of ownership and control (since managers own significantly more stock at minority-owned PE-backed firms than at majority-owned PE-backed firms). Although all four coefficients on MINORITY_PE have the predicted signs, just two are statistically significant based on a two-tailed t-test, providing mixed evidence in support of P1a (i.e., minority-owned, PE-backed firms avoid less tax than majority-owned, PE-backed firms). With respect to the marginal costs of tax avoidance, all four coefficients on LARGE_PE are significant in the predicted direction but none of the coefficients on MANY_PE are statistically significant. Thus, the results in Panel A suggest firms owned by large PE firms enjoy lower marginal costs of tax avoidance but firms owned by PE firms with many portfolio companies do not.
We now use our sample of management-owned and PE-backed firms to test whether private firms that are owned by large PE firms or by PE firms with many portfolio firms have lower marginal costs of tax avoidance (P2a and P2b), following the Heckman (1979) estimation procedure. Panel B summarizes the results where MGMT_OWNED is now our proxy for the separation of ownership and control and we also include our proxies for the marginal cost of tax avoidance (i.e., MANY_PE and LARGE_PE). The results in Panel B reveal that three of the four coefficients on MGMT_OWNED are statistically significant in the predicted directions based on two-tailed t-tests even after controlling for the marginal costs of tax avoidance (the fourth coefficient is marginally significant based on one-tailed t-test). In addition, all of the coefficients on MANY_PE and LARGE_PE are significant in the predicted direction, except for the coefficients on MANY_PE in the DTAX and SHELTER regressions. Overall, the results in Panels A and B indicate that the separation of ownership and control (as proxied Table 6 Results for regressions that examine the dual impact of the separation of ownership and control and the marginal costs of tax planning on corporate tax avoidance. by MGMT_OWNED and MINORITY_PE) has a significant, predictable impact on tax avoidance, even after controlling for the marginal costs of avoidance across different types of firms. Empirical prediction P2c predicts that the difference in tax avoidance between small-sized, PE-backed and managementowned firms is larger than the difference in tax avoidance between large-sized, PE-backed and management-owned firms, since large firms may enjoy economies of scale to tax planning that are independent of PE ownership. We perform a difference-in-difference analysis based on our sample of management-owned and PE-backed private firms to empirically test this prediction. We first classify firms as small-vs. large-sized, where small-sized (large-sized) firms are those in the lowest (highest) quartile of net sales for all private firms. We then remove firms that are not small-or large-sized and estimate the following equation:
GAAP_ETR CASH_ETR DTAX SHELTER
In this model specification, the coefficients on the four indicator variables (α 1 -a 4 ) capture the average value for each tax avoidance measure for each type of firm (e.g., small-sized vs. large-sized, PE-backed firms), after controlling for numerous firm characteristics. We predict that the difference in coefficients between small-sized, PE-backed and management-owned firms is larger than the difference in coefficients between large-sized, PE-backed and management-owned firms. Table 6 , Panel C, summarizes the results of our difference-in-difference analyses (control variables included but not tabulated). The differences in tax avoidance (see bottom of Panel C) are in the predicted directions, although the results based on DTAX are not Table 7 Summary of results for regressions that use the proportion of stock owned by managers (MGR_STOCK) as the proxy for separation of ownership and control (rather than MGMT_OWNED). n, nn, nnn indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-tailed t-test, respectively. Regressions include the following control variables: RNOA, A and B) , INDUS, and YEAR variables, which have not been tabulated. The t-statistics have been adjusted to control for clustering by multiple firm observations. All variables are as defined in the Appendix.
LOSS, NOL. LEV, INTANG, MNC, AB_ACCR, EQ_EARN, SALES_GR, ASSETS, SOX, INV_MILLS (Panels
significant. For example, the difference in CASH_ETR between small-sized firms (À 0.103) is significantly larger than the difference in CASH_ETR between large-sized firms (À0.016); P-value for F-test is 0.021. The results in Panel C are consistent with small-sized firms experiencing the greatest tax savings from PE ownership. Overall, the results in Table 6 indicate that large firms (Panel C) and certain PE-backed firms (Panels A and B) have lower marginal costs of tax avoidance than other private firms. Nonetheless, the separation of ownership and control (as proxied by MGMT_OWNED and MINORITY_PE) has a significant impact on tax avoidance even after controlling for variation in the marginal costs of avoidance across firms.
Results for tests based on managerial stock ownership rates
A more direct proxy for the separation of ownership and control is the proportion of stock owned by top executives (MGR_STOCK). Because this hand-collected data is not available for our entire sample of private firms, we view this measure as an alternative proxy for the separation of ownership and control. Table 7 summarizes results for supplemental tests that are based on MGR_STOCK rather than MGMT_OWNED. First, we re-estimate Table 4 Heckman regressions, replacing MGMT_OWNED with MGR_STOCK. The coefficients on MGR_STOCK are presented in Panel A and they consistently indicate that corporate tax avoidance is decreasing in managerial stock ownership. Next, we partition our sample into managementowned (Panel B) and PE-backed firms (Panel C) and estimate Eq. (2) using ordinary least squares regression. The results in both panels also generally indicate that tax avoidance is decreasing in managerial stock ownership within each subsample of private firms.
To test empirical prediction P3 (i.e., holding the marginal costs of tax avoidance constant, income tax avoidance is decreasing in managerial stock ownership), we re-estimate Table 6 , Panels A and B regressions. However, we replace MGMT_OWNED with MGR_STOCK and we include our proxies for the marginal costs of tax avoidance. Table 7 , Panel D, summarizes the results for OLS regressions based on our sample of PE-backed firms only, while Panel E summarizes results based on our sample of management-owned and PE-backed firms. Across Panels D and E, all of the coefficients on MGR_STOCK have the predicted signs and 6 of the 8 coefficients are statistically significant. In addition, all of the coefficients on LARGE_PE are significant in the predicted directions while only 4 of the 8 coefficients on MANY_PE are significant in the predicted directions. Overall, the results for MGR_STOCK in Table 7 confirm our findings in Tables 4 and 6 and indicate that separation of ownership and control has a significant influence on corporate tax avoidance, even after controlling for variation in the marginal costs of avoidance across different types of firms.
Tax avoidance strategies and the utilization of subsidiaries in foreign tax havens
To gain a better understanding of the tax strategies used by our sample of private firms, we hand-collected detailed income tax data from SEC filings for subsamples of management-owned and PE-backed firms matched on industry and year. Specifically, we collected data from Form 10-K statutory reconciliation schedules, which reveal material sources of differences between effective and statutory tax rates, and thus sources of variation in our tax avoidance measures. The results in Table 8 , Panel A, indicate that compared to management-owned firms, PE-backed firms report more negative statutory reconciliation items related to foreign taxes, intangible assets, tax-exempt income (e.g. corporate-owned life insurance policies), and tax credits, consistent with PE-backed firms relying on a variety of tax reduction strategies. We further investigate the use of tax avoidance strategies that involve foreign subsidiaries. Multinational corporations commonly reduce their worldwide tax burdens by strategically locating operations in low tax countries, including "tax havens."
35 Following the methodology in Dyreng et al. (2011) , we calculate the number of subsidiaries located in tax havens for management-owned vs. PE-backed sample firms. The results in Table 8 , Panel B, indicate that management-owned firms have significantly fewer subsidiaries in tax haven countries than PE-backed private firms. Overall, the results in Table 8 suggest that PE-backed firms use a variety of tax strategies to reduce their tax liabilities, including tax planning through foreign operations. 4.7. Supplemental analyses 4.7.1. Alternative approaches to addressing and evaluating endogeneity Because PE firms may select firms to acquire based on specific observable attributes (as opposed to unobservable attributes), we also perform our tests based on propensity score matched samples of management-owned and PE-backed firms. In our study, the propensity score matching procedure would be effective if the selection bias (i.e., PE firm ownership) can be entirely explained by observable factors (Tucker, 2010) . In case the selection bias in our sample is based on both observable and unobservable factors we also perform our tests based on both the propensity score matching and Heckman (1979) procedures (see discussion below).
We first calculate propensity scores derived from a probit model, where the dependent variable is a PE-backed indicator variable (PE_BACKED), and the model includes variables that are significantly different between management-owned and PE-backed firms, including RNOA, LOSS, NOL, LEV, MNC, INTANG, AB_ACCR, SALES, and ASSETS. We then match each management-owned firm-year, one-to-one, to the PE-backed firm-year with the closest propensity score without replacement. To ensure that each management-owned firm-year and its match are similar to each other, we restrict the two firms to have propensity scores within 0.10 of each other. We then use OLS regression to re-estimate Eq. (2) based on the propensity score matched samples of management-owned and PE-backed firms. The results (untabulated) are similar to those shown in Table 4 , Panel B. Specifically, the coefficients on MGMT_OWN are all significant in the predicted directions. We also re-estimate Eq. (2) based on both the propensity score matched samples and following the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. The results are substantially similar to those for OLS regressions based on propensity score matched samples, as described above. Larcker and Rusticus (2010) explain that it is sometimes difficult to obtain reliable instrumental variables when addressing endogeneity issues. An alternative approach is to assess how large the endogeneity problem must be to overturn the results generated based on OLS (i.e., without controlling for endogeneity). We adopt their approach and calculate the "impact threshold for a confounding variable" (ITCV) for each MGMT_OWNED coefficient in the OLS regressions shown in Table 4 , Panel C. In general, higher ITCVs indicate that OLS results are robust to omitted variable concerns. The ITCVs for MGMT_OWNED in Table 4 , Panel C, are much higher than the benchmarks described in Larcker and Rusticus (2010) Table 7 , i.e., Impact and Impact Raw . 37 We conclude it is unlikely that endogeneity concerns can overturn our main finding, i.e., that tax avoidance is increasing in the separation of ownership and control. Lastly, we perform two final tests to evaluate whether tax is a significant predictor of PE ownership (e.g., if PE firms frequently acquire firms with relatively high tax burdens). First, we create a sample of public firms in the 5 years before they are taken private by either management or a PE firm. We then estimate Eq. (1) -the PE ownership regression -and include each of our tax measures (i.e., GAAP_ETR, CASH_ETR, DTAX, and SHELTER). None of the coefficients on the tax measures is a significant predictor of PE ownership (results untabulated). Second, we create a sample of public firms that were either taken private by a PE firm or were never taken private. We again estimate Eq. (1) and include each of our tax measures. As before, none of the coefficients on the tax measures is a significant predictor of PE ownership (results untabulated). We conclude that tax is not a significant predictor of PE ownership for our sample of private firms, consistent with Mehran and Peristiani (2010) . Overall, we conclude that our findings are strongly robust to a variety of econometric techniques that evaluate and/or correct for endogeneity between PE firm ownership and corporate tax avoidance. 35 In this paper, the term "tax haven" refers to a country that has been designated a "tax haven" by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), due to its exceptionally low income tax rates and other favorable tax attributes relative to other countries. We thank Scott Dyreng for allowing us to use his database.
36 Untabulated analysis further indicates that PE-backed firms have a significantly higher mean tax fees paid to auditors than management-owned firms, consistent with PE-backed firms investing more resources in tax planning. 37 We calculate the ITCVs in a manner consistent with Frank (2000) , which derives the minimum correlations necessary to turn a statistically significant result into a borderline insignificant result. Specifically, the ITCV for MGMT_OWNED in the CASH_ETR regression is 0.069, which implies that the correlations between MGMT_OWNED and CASH_ETR and the unobserved confounding variable each need to be about 0.263 ( ¼√0.069) to overturn the OLS results. This correlation is significantly higher than the "Impact" of the variable with the greatest influence on the MGMT_OWNED coefficient in the CASH_ETR OLS regression: LOSS (Impact¼0.016). Thus, the confounding variable would need to have a larger impact on CASH_ETR than LOSS to overturn the coefficient on MGMT_OWNED. Nonetheless, similar to Larcker and Rusticus (2010) , we acknowledge that impact thresholds are difficult to establish and so our results should be viewed with caution.
4.7.2. Deletion of firms with negative pre-tax income Although our calculation of GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR require the deletion of firm-years if the sum of pre-tax income over years tÀ2 to year t is negative, we do not impose a similar data requirement on the other measures of tax avoidance (i.e., DTAX and SHELTER). To further evaluate whether our results are sensitive to the exclusion of firms with negative pre-tax income, we impose a 3-year, positive pre-tax income data requirement on regressions where DTAX and SHELTER are the dependent variables. Our results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar for this smaller, more profitable sample of firms relative to those shown in all tabulated analyses. We also note that the correlations between our four tax avoidance measures strengthen when we require all sample observations to have positive, cumulative pre-tax income over a three year time period.
4.7.3. Tax benefits from employee stock options Graham et al. (2004) find that employee stock options (ESOs) generate significant tax savings and reduce marginal tax rates for large firms, and thus are important non-debt tax shields. While tax deductions related to ESOs reduce cash effective tax rates, they are not directly reflected in GAAP_ETR, DTAX, or SHELTER. Consistent with PE firms tying portfolio firm management compensation to performance, the CEOs of PE-backed portfolio firms more frequently receive stock options than the CEOs of non-PE-backed firms (Katz, 2009 ). However, as pointed out by Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) , the equity stake of a portfolio firm manager is illiquid because the manager cannot sell portfolio firm equity or exercise stock options until the firm is publicly-traded. As a result, we do not expect stock options to generate tax benefits for PE-backed firms, which should bias against finding our predicted results.
To empirically evaluate the impact of stock options on corporate tax burdens, we utilize ESO tax benefit data (TXBCO and TXBCOF) that is available on Compustat for fiscal years 2005 and thereafter. Although less than 15% of our sample observations report non-zero ESO tax benefits, the amounts that are reported are not statistically different between management-owned and PE-backed firms. Overall, we conclude that ESO tax benefits do not significantly influence our results.
Conclusions
In this study we investigate the impact of ownership structure on corporate tax avoidance. We take advantage of a unique sample of firms with privately-owned equity but publicly-traded debt and examine whether variation in the separation of ownership and control influences the tax avoidance of private firms. Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that when equity ownership and corporate decision-making are concentrated in just a small number of decision-makers, these ownermanagers will likely be more risk averse and thus less willing to invest in risky projects. Because income tax avoidance is a risky activity that can impose significant costs on a firm, we predict that firms with greater concentrations of ownership and control (and thus more risk averse managers) avoid less income tax than firms with less concentrated ownership and control. Our results are consistent with expectations. However, we also consider a competing explanation for these findings. In particular, we examine whether certain PE firms are able to reduce portfolio firms' marginal costs of tax avoidance, resulting in greater tax avoidance at PE-backed firms than at management-owned firms. Our results are consistent with the marginal costs of tax avoidance and the separation of ownership and control both influencing corporate tax practices. Overall, these findings increase our understanding of whether and how ownership structure influences corporate tax practices.
Our findings are subject to several limitations. First, PE firms do not randomly select firms to acquire. To the extent PE firm acquisition choices are correlated with target firm tax planning, then PE firm ownership could be endogenously related to tax avoidance in our sample, which would cause OLS coefficient estimates to be biased. To mitigate potential selection bias in our empirical tests, we employ a variety of econometric techniques, including the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedure, a propensity score matching procedure, and the alternative approach described in Larcker and Rusticus (2010) . Regardless of whether or how we correct for endogeneity in our empirical tests, inferences from the results are always the same: tax avoidance is increasing in the separation of ownership and control. Nonetheless, we caution readers to not place substantial weight on the magnitudes of our coefficient estimates but to instead focus on the consistency of the signs and significance levels of our results.
Second, our main results are based on a sample of management-owned and PE-backed private firms that are required to file financial statements with the SEC. These firms provide a powerful research setting for our research question because our sample exhibits substantial variation in the separation of ownership and control but holds financial reporting requirements relatively constant across all firms. Although our sample of private firms is subject to less financial reporting pressure than public firms, we acknowledge that PE-backed firms are likely subject to somewhat greater financial reporting pressure than management-owned firms (since PE-backed firms are typically sold or taken public 5-7 years after they are taken private). Thus, our results could be influenced by differences in financial reporting pressure at management-owned and PE-backed private firms. We note, however, that we continue to find a negative association between managerial stock ownership and income tax avoidance when we repeat our tests using the proportion of stock owned by managers as our proxy for the separation of ownership and control within subsamples that contain only management-owned or only PE-backed firms. We conclude that financial reporting incentives do not drive our main results.
Our study seeks to understand the fundamental firm characteristics that influence corporate tax avoidance by relying on principle-agent theory to build a framework for understanding how one specific feature of ownership structure, namely the separation of ownership and control, impacts corporate tax practices. Our findings contribute toward a better understanding of the impact of insider control on corporate tax avoidance (e.g., Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001 ) and complements recent research that examines how agency costs and managerial incentives influence corporate tax practices (e.g., Dharmapala, 2006, 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Rego and Wilson, 2012) .
Appendix. Variable measurement
Measures of tax avoidance
GAAP_ETR
Firm i's GAAP effective tax rate, which equals total income tax expense (Compustat TXT), over years t À 2 to t, divided by the sum of pre-tax income (PI) minus special items (SPI) in year t À 2 to t. If data limitations prohibit us from using years t À 2 to t, we next use years t À 1 to t, followed by year t. GAAP_ETR is set to missing when the denominator is zero or negative and we winsorize GAAP_ETR to the range [0,1] CASH_ETR Firm i's cash effective tax rate, which equals cash taxes paid (TXPD), over years t À 2 to t, divided by the sum of pretax net income (PI) minus special items (SPI) in years tÀ 2 to t. If data limitations prohibit us from using years t À 2 to t, we next use years t À 1 to t, followed by year t. CASH_ETR is set to missing when the denominator is zero or negative and we winsorize CASH_ETR to the range 1 if the number of firms owned by the PE firm is greater than 200 and the ratio of equity invested divided by number of firms owned is greater than $30 million and 0 otherwise EMPLOYEE_OWNED 1 if the firm does not have a PE sponsor and more than 50% of the equity is owned by the firms' employees, and 0 otherwise LARGE 1 if the firm's sales are in the top quartile of net sales (SALE) for all private firms and zero otherwise SMALL 1 if the firm's sales are in the bottom quartile of net sales (SALE) for all private firms and zero otherwise
Control variables and other variables of interest AB_ACCR Firm i's abnormal total accruals in year t computed derived from the modified cross-sectional Jones (1991) model. To estimate the model yearly by two-digit SIC code, we require that at least 10 observations be available. The regression is: TACC j,t /TAj, t À 1 ¼ a 1 n[1/TA j, t-1 ]þ a 2 n[(ΔREV j, t À ΔTR j, t )/TA j , t-1 ] þ a 3 n[PPE j, t /TAj, t-1 ] where TACC is total accruals for firm j in year t, which is defined as income before extraordinary items (IBC) minus net cash flow from operating activities, adjusted to extraordinary items and discontinued operations OANCF À XIDOC). For the years prior to 1988, TACC is defined as Δ(current assets ACT) À Δ(current liabilities LCT) À Δ(cash CHE)þ Δ(short-term debt DLC) À (depreciation and amortization DPC). To correct for measurement errors in the balance-sheet approach, we eliminate firm-year observations with "non-articulating" events (Hribar and Collins, 2002) . TA is the beginning-of-the-year total assets (lagged AT). ΔREV is the change in sales in year t (SALE), PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment in year t (PPEGT), and ΔTR is the change in trade receivables in year t (RECTR). To control for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses, the modified Jones model is augmented with the following independent variables: cash flow from operations in year t (CF t ), a dummy variable set to 1 if CF t o 1 and 0 otherwise (DCF t ), and an interactive variable, CF t Â DCF t (as suggested by Ball and Shivakumar, 2006) . CF t is defined, for years after 1988, as cash from operations in year t adjusted for extraordinary items and discontinued operations (OANCF-XIDOC), and prior to 1988 as funds from operations (FOPT)-Δ(current assets ACT) þΔ(cash and cash equivalent CHE) þΔ(current liabilities LCT)-Δ(short-term debt DLC). All variables are standardized by total assets at year-end t À 1 ASSETS Natural logarithm of the total assets (AT) for firm i, at the end of year t EQ_EARN Firm i's equity income in earnings (ESUB) in year t, scaled by lagged total assets FIRM_AGE Firm i's age (years since first appearance on Compustat) INTANG Firm i's intangible assets (INTAN) in year t, scaled by lagged total assets INV_MILLS The inverse mills ratio from Heckman (1979) two-stage sample selection correction procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the following probit model:
All other variables as defined in the Appendix. We use the estimates from the first-stage probit model to compute the inverse Mills' ratio for each sample firm-year. The inverse Mills' ratio serves as a control variable in Eq. (1), which is the second step of the Heckman estimation procedure. (Inverse Mills ratio is defined as λ(Z)¼ φ(Ζ)/Ф(Z) if private or PE-backed ¼ 1, and λ(Z) ¼ Àφ(Ζ)/ (1 À Ф(Z)) if private or PE-backed ¼0, where φ(Ζ) is the standard normal pdf, Ф(Z) is the standard normal cdf, and Z are the estimates of the first stage probit model) LEV Firm i's leverage in year t, measured as total long-term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets LOSS 1 if firm i reports a loss, where loss is net income before extraordinary items (IBC) and 0 otherwise MNC 1 if firm's foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) or foreign income taxes (TXFO) is positive or negative and 0 otherwise NOL 1 if firm i has net operating loss carryforwards (TLCF) available at the beginning of year t, and 0 otherwise OPER_CYCLE Firm i's length of operating cycle, calculated as (yearly average accounts receivable (RECT t ))/(total revenues (SALE t )/360) þ(yearly average inventory (INVT t ))/(cost of goods sold (COGS t )/360) Q_RATIO Firm i's quick ratio, calculated as cash and short-term investments (#CHE t ) þtotal receivables (RECT t ), scaled by current liabilities (LCT t ) RNOA Firm i's operating income divided by net operating assets, where operating income is net income (NI) þ Δ(cumulative translation adjustment RECTA) þafter-tax interest expense (XINT) À after-tax interest income (IDIT)þ minority interest in income (MII). Net operating assets (NOA) are common equity (CEQ) þdebt in current liabilities (DLC) þ total long-term debt (DLTT) þpreferred stock (PSTK) À cash and short-term investments (CHE) À investments and advances (IVAO) þminority interest (MIB) (see Nissim and Penman, 2003 ) SALES_GR Firm i's sales growth, where sales growth is sales (SALE) at the end of year t less sales at the beginning of year t divided by sales at the beginning of year t SOX 1 if the fiscal year is 2004 and thereafter Σ k INDUS 1 (0) if firm i is (is not) in industry k in year t, based on three-digit SIC codes Σ t YEAR 1 (0) if firm i is (is not) in year t
